How the Fed Came to Be

An interesting brief history of banking in the US, 1811-1913. More here.

NGDP Targeting, the "Volcker Moment", and Chuck Norris

Free Exchange points out that the tight-money policy of Paul Volcker in the early 1980s:

did not succeed by changing people’s expectations of inflation. It succeeded by crushing demand. As unemployment moved up the Phillips Curve, inflation plummeted. Only then did inflation expectations stabilize at a lower level.... The lesson of the Volcker disinflation is that changing expectations depends crucially on delivering on the target. Naming an inflation or money supply target is helpful, but insufficient unless the central bank demonstrates it is willing and able to achieve it. 

That statement reminded me of this post from Worthwhile Canadian Initiative:

Thesis. We teach the monetary policy transmission mechanism like this: the central bank pulls a lever, and that lever pulls other levers, which eventually move the target variable in the direction the central bank wants to move.
Antithesis. That's wrong. A credible central bank is exactly like Chuck Norris. It looks at the thing it wants to move, and the thing moves, and all the other levers fall into place where they should be. Causation runs backwards from the target variable. Credible central banks don't actually do anything. They just threaten to do things. But a credible central bank never needs to carry out its threats.
Synthesis. That's not quite right either.
1. Even Chuck Norris can't make the impossible happen. A credible central bank can move the economy just by saying that it wants the economy to move. But it must be a new equilibrium that it moves to. And maybe that new equilibrium won't be an equilibrium unless the central bank moves its lever. Chuck Norris can't clear the room if he is standing in the only doorway. He has to step aside to let people exit, even if he doesn't need to throw anyone out.
2. Chuck Norris wasn't always Chuck Norris. He had to earn his reputation. In the early days, or in unfamiliar territory, he actually had to carry out his threats. Till people learned the new regime.

Basically, in order for Chuck Norris to impact behavior, people have to think he'll kick their ass. The central bank (Fed) has to convince people that it's going to do what it says it intends to do when circumstances dictate. In other words, every now and then, Ben has to kick some ass. If you want higher NGDP, you can't make it happen by standing in the room looking tough. You have to actually break a few skulls.

Lots of Global Macro in the News

China (more here)

India

Argentina

Australia

Ireland

Italy

Greece

Spain

More on Italy, Greece, Spain, and the ECB crisis here and here.

If, say, you were a student and had to write a country paper report, I would say there is a lot going on with a lot of economies around the world to find an interesting topic. Just sayin.

How the Fed Came to Be (and Why it Must Remain Independent)

An interesting brief history of banking in the US, 1811-1913. More here.

Early efforts to reform the financial system were limited to the First and Second Banks of the United
States (1791-1811 and 1816-36, respectively). Both institutions were short-lived because of public misgivings
about concentrated economic power. A period of laissez-faire (or free-market) banking followed, rife with
flawed banking practices and instability. In 1863 and 1865, Congress enacted the National Banking Acts
to stabilize the financial system. Without a central bank, however, problems remained—financial crises and
banks failures continued to be frequent and severe. Two characteristics of the National Banking System (NBS),
created by the 1863 Act, exacerbated this volatility: (i) immobile bank reserves in a system lacking a lender
of last resort and (ii) an inflexible supply of currency. [Emphasis added.]

So, you might say, we should just put central banking under direct control of the government. How wonderful and democratic that would be! Do that, and I can almost guarantee higher rates of inflation as Congress has the incentive to use the money supply to "monetize" its deficits and debt.

The Best Description of the 2011 Nobel Laureates' Work so Far

From Alex Tabarrok at MR. On Sargent:

[In response to the Lucas Critique] Sargent’s (1973, 1976) early work showed how models incorporating rational expectations could be tested empirically. In many of these early models, Sargent showed that including rational expectations in a model could lead to invariance results, nominal shocks caused by changes in the money supply, for example, wouldn’t matter.

I was never comfortable with the simple RE approach (and hated being forced to study it in grad school), which is why I'm glad AT mentions some of Sargents more recent work:

What will people do when they don’t know the true model of the economy? How will they update their model of the economy based on observations? In these learning models the goal is to look for a self-confirming equilibrium. The interesting thing about a self-confirming equilibrium is that people’s expectations and learning can converge on a false model of the economy!

On Sims:

In response [to the Lucas Critique], he developed vector auto regressions. In its simplest form a VAR is just a regression of a variable on its past values and the past values of other related variables. It’s easy to run a VAR on unemployment, inflation and output, for example.... Sims, however, took the models a step further by showing that you could identify fundamental shocks in these models by making assumptions about the dynamics or ordering of the shocks. ... With identification in hand one can then use these models to plot impulse response functions. How does a shock to oil prices work its way through the economy? When does GDP begin to fall and by how much? How long does it take the economy to recover? What about a shock to monetary policy? Sims (1992), for example, looks at monetary shocks in five modern economies.

It's a liquidity trap

From Modeled Behavior:

In some cases people suspect that the Central Bank will vacuum up
every single dollar it dropped. In those cases, the dropping doesn’t
make anyone happier because they are just going to get hurt again by the
exact same amount.

This is a liquidity trap.

Hence, monetary policy won't work much, but fiscal policy has been limited by politics (in fact there has been no net fiscal policy - see here), so what can Ben do but try crazy things like the twist?

What Ron Paul and Michelle Bachman Aspire for the US to Become

From Bruce Bartlett (former Reagan tax adviser), countries with minimal government sizes: Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Chad, Republic of Congo, and Myanmar. Could probably add Somalia (no government) to this list, too.

Some Links on the Recession and Response

Expectations matter. Maybe the letters saying further action would be bad for the economy were self-fulfilling because of the impact of the announcement on expectations. On paper, Ben did the right thing. What's going on in investors' brains the last week or so is another matter.
Taxing the rich. Even if it doesn't raise substantially more income, and may have unintended consequences, redistributing from savers to spenders is probably helpful in the short run (and design matters).
Are pensions Ponzis? They need not be, but they do have Ponzi-like attributes, and it is tempting for managers to raid them (including - especially? - when they're run by "public servants").
Much ado has been made of recent upward revisions to Ireland's growth for last quarter, because they implemented austerity instead of stimulus. Problem: They're much farther behind their 2007 peak than the other developed countries that got hit.
The spending side: Biggest contributor to our deficit increase in the last 10 years; the biggest revenue contributor: the recession itself, followed by the 2001 & 2003 tax cuts.

Links on the current (and future?) recession

The Beer Recession (Economix)
Growth and Jobs, a.k.a. Okun's "Law" (Free Exchange)
The "R" word on the rise (The Economist)
Technology and jobs: Short run vs. Long run (Free Exchange)
Housing prices versus rental prices. Somethings gotta give (read: Sell my effing house!) (Economix)
Debt and growth according to the IMF (BBC News) My view is that it's not so much debt as political risk. In the short run, the fundamentals of our (and Europe's) economy can withstand the current levels, burdens, and rates of growth in the levels and burdens, in the debt. I also don't see specific policy "A" or specific policy "B" as being the most important thing, so much as greater agreement, consensus and confidence that policies will be stable of the the forseeable time horizon. In the long run debt does matter, but anyone who claims to be serious about controlling it must admit that three things have to be on the table: (1) taxes; (2) defense; and (3) programs for seniors.

Macro model?

I'm wondering what, if any, economic model (macro or otherwise?) political conservatives are applying when they advocate for tax cuts as a remedy to the current recession.

Some links on jobs and macro

Denser cities? (Ryan Avent OpEd for NYT)
Free Exchange on Cowen's Austrian predictions in 2005. Apparently he predicted a crisis, but not the one we got. (Noriel Roubini predicted the same crisis using more Keynesian principles!)
GDP and GDI: Which is the better measure? They should be roughly the same, with the difference being "statistical discrepancy". Basically, it's a difference that comes from differences in sample collection: firms versus households. For some reason, GDI seems to pick up turning points in the business cycle better. (links here, here, and here) Bottom line: things are still bad, but not as bad as we thought, maybe.
Some thoughts on the CPI: How important is health care? (Econbrowser)
How much does growth trickle down? (Economix)
The ethics of unemployment. (Freakonomics)

Links on Macro stuff

Alternative macro indicators? (Economist)

The twitter version of Bernanke's Jackson Hole Speech: (1) high unemployment; (2) disinflation; (3) urgency; (4) it's not just structural; (5) we've still got ammo; (6) we're reloading; (7) short run fiscal stimulus still needed; (8) long run fiscal austerity always needed. (Freakonomics)

The twitter version of the long-term deficit problem: (1) Bush tax cuts. (Economix)

Can a double-dip be avoided? (Economist)

Pay incentives on Wall Street: get ready to go through this again soon. (VOX)

Is Bernanke Giving Us All the Bird?

This stock photo of Bernanke is a bit unsettling, no?

The solution is growth (Daron Acemoglu - HBR Blog)? Will growth curb the debt problem or will debt reduction stimulate growth?

A neat randomization technique to facilitate truth-telling (Freakonomics).

As Greenspan says - we'll never be "forced" to default. Greece didn't have this option. Whither Euro? (Financial Times)

The downside of self-regulating occupational licensing boards (Jay Parkinson)

More policy options that would be dominated by a carbon tax. (Freakonomics)

Another way of looking at the value-added problem in trade statistics. Not all of the "Made in China" product's value should be counted as China's exports? But where do the profits really end up? (NYTimes)

I'm guessing the blockquote here is toungue-in-cheek. (Caplan) I worry about students who only learn a particular algorithm for applying knowledge to specific situations. Those students will be easily replaced by computers. Learn to think.

Some Random Links

An interesting short piece on the Isreli-Palestinian conflict (Haushofer, et al.)
A shamelessly self-interested link - somebody buy our house!
Is there a great divergence? (Rodrik)
Summary of an interview by Felix Simon with Larry Summers. Sentences to ponder:

The Treasury bond rate, Treasury note rate for ten years is 2.85 percent. Nobody is failing to invest because 2.85 percent is too much. They are failing to invest because there are no customers in their store. They are failing to invest because their factories are sitting empty. They are failing to innovate because they’re not sure how large the market for the product will be.

We don't need a C.E.O. A country is not a business. We need a policy expert. (Economix)

Economics for kids? (Freakonomics)

Banerjee on Poverty. (Economist)

Debt impacts of new policies GWB vs. BHO.

Some links

Increasing taxes a little and funding health reform may do more good (at least in the short run) than cutting spending. Someone remind folks that tax revenues are already at 50 year lows as a percentage of GDP.

A similar (but maybe a bit less firm) conclusion here.

More similar conclusions from Krugman on modern Keynesianism (on VOX not his hackish blog).

A couple of cool statistics links:

Paydays are a killer?

Billion Prices Project

Some institutional links:

Gender bias and agricultural technology

Cursed by resources or institutions?

Why continuing to be a Royals fan (among other things) is good for me.

Exports are overrated?

Some links

There is no great stagnation. (Free Exchange)
Rule #1: Buy low sell high. Rule #2: You can't make up a per-unit loss with quantity. Don't forget rule #1.
Optimal punishment for bribery: giving a bribe is legal, soliciting is illegal. (Economist)
Optimal bribery for kids. (Boston Globe)
Rent vs. Buy (Economix)
Selling Government Land (MR)

Interesting

From Economix:

Very few countries default because they can’t afford to pay their debts, either to their own citizens or to foreigners. Defaults occur when the political process in a country determines that, for whatever reason, the government cannot raise sufficient revenue.

Interesting. It mentions the debt-to-revenue ratio as a critical factor in determining the sustainability (read: servicability) of our debt. Even with the tax-cut crazy republicans dictating the agenda, we're not at a critical level on that statistic.

Huh?

A couple of articles from this weeks Economist have me puzzled. There seems to be a bit of contradiction or confusion in their editorial office.
First, we have the Economist lending credibility to the idea that the "redback" might become a player as a reserve currency. I'm skeptical.
Seocnd, hedge funds are shorting China (i.e. betting on the notion that their boom is about up). On the one hand, this might be self-fulfilling; on the other hand it might explain the US-China trade deficits in terms of the standard inter-temporal current account macro model (if you expect the US to grow in the future, our running trade deficits today is optimal; if you expect China to shrink in the future, their running of trade surplusses today is optimal).
More on the Yuan from Econbrowser.

The Illogic of Debt Ceiling Politics

One interesting sentence:

If the government is (a) required by the deficit legislation to spend,
and (b) precluded by the debt legislation from borrowing, the Treasury
would be forced into default.

From James Hamilton. There is more; all of it is good.