It's student evaluation season, which always puts me in a sunny mood. While there are some studies that apparently refute the hypothesis that leniency buys better evaluations, there are reasons to be suspicious of the validity of these OLS results. For example, in hard departments like science and engineering, someone is going to appear to be better than the others, and it is hard to control for individual characteristics of the students in anonomized surveys that can't be matched up to the observable characteristics about those individuals. But I digress...
One thing that strikes me as an interesting hypothesis is to test what would happen to teaching evaluations by changing the sequencing of the questions. For example, in the forms I will administer next week, (the "Student Instructional Report II, or SIRII) the very last questions before the overall evaluation ask students about their effort and the course's difficulty. If behavioral economics teaches us something, it's that framing (or maybe this is anchoring?) matters in survey design. It seems like a neat workaround to test the "leniency hypothesis" would be to change the order of the question so that effort and difficulty are randomly asked their overall evalution either before or after the difficulty and effort questions.
Thursday, April 10, 2014
Tuesday, April 1, 2014
Coming to Econ from Econ
Noah Smith writes this post on the advantages and disadvantages of coming to an econ graduate program from a physics undergraduate major. The upshot: It helps a little and it hurts a little. The same can be said for coming to econ from econ.
The big advantage doing econ from undergrad all the way through is that when you get to grad school you already speak the language and know the intuition - at least on the micro side of things.
There are two potential disadvantages to coming to this path. First, if you're like me, your undergraduate focused on policy economics, and you learned about things like IS-LM, fiscal policy, and monetary policy on the macro side; and public goods, externalities, and other market failures on the micro side. This knowledge will not help you survive the core micro or macro sequence in grad school. In fact, it will likely hurt you (especially in the macro side).
The other disadvantage is not enough math. If you're like me you took a few semesters of calculus, some stats, an econometrics course, and maybe even a decent math econ class and thought you were hot shit. What do you win for all that? A rude effing awakening when you get to grad school. If you do econ, pair it with a math and/or stats minor, at least - maybe even a double major.
The big advantage doing econ from undergrad all the way through is that when you get to grad school you already speak the language and know the intuition - at least on the micro side of things.
There are two potential disadvantages to coming to this path. First, if you're like me, your undergraduate focused on policy economics, and you learned about things like IS-LM, fiscal policy, and monetary policy on the macro side; and public goods, externalities, and other market failures on the micro side. This knowledge will not help you survive the core micro or macro sequence in grad school. In fact, it will likely hurt you (especially in the macro side).
The other disadvantage is not enough math. If you're like me you took a few semesters of calculus, some stats, an econometrics course, and maybe even a decent math econ class and thought you were hot shit. What do you win for all that? A rude effing awakening when you get to grad school. If you do econ, pair it with a math and/or stats minor, at least - maybe even a double major.
Thursday, September 26, 2013
Reverse Causality
The headline "Does the value of driving differ across states?" seems to imply that driving more causes higher incomes. Couldn't it very well be the opposite? Higher GDPs per capita lead to higher population densities, higher congestion, higher property values where jobs are, and hence more total miles driven?
Friday, August 23, 2013
Distortions, Taxes, Absurdity, and What they can Teach Us about Tyler Cowen
Recently, Professor Cowen made the post, "I am sorry but this is absurd" in response to an article by Charles Manski, summarized on VOXEU. The crux of the paper, and of the summary, is that too much analysis of taxation focuses on the various distortions they create, and too little of the analysis goes towards what the tax revenues are used for (infrastructure, in the complete version of the research). How I feel about this issue is not the topic of my post. Instead I choose to focus on Professor Cowen's response to it, and what it really teaches us.
1. I do not believe that Professor Cowen is truly sorry for saying Professor Manski's article (and post in VOXEU) is absurd. I think that at best Professor Cowen has what he might call "meta-preference" for feeling sorry, because he thinks that he "should" feel sorry for posting such an unprofessional and unthoughtful headline to his response to Manski, but I don't think he is in fact sorry. The reason is that if you read Cowen's post, it is quite long, and in fact contains some intelligent and well thought-out points, which to me shows that he has carefully thought about how he feels about the issue.
2. I think the statement "this is absurd" tells us more about Cowen than it does about the piece by Manski. I do not mean this to be turning the term "absurd" on Cowen's view, because I think the details of his post have some merit. Rather I think his use of "absurd" mostly tells us that Cowen feels very strongly that taxes are distortionary and that this should be a topic of focus when economists discuss them. This view has some merit, but it fails to recognize that the alternative to a market "distorted" by government and taxes is seldom a free and well-functioning market in the neoclassical sense. Focusing on the distortions of taxes and government do a poor job of recognizing the ways in which a well functioning (even if also very large) government can help to make property rights more secure and reduce the transactions costs and risks associated with impersonal market exchange. Higher taxes can introduce some distortions, but they may be better than the distortions introduced under the next-best (institutional) alternative.
1. I do not believe that Professor Cowen is truly sorry for saying Professor Manski's article (and post in VOXEU) is absurd. I think that at best Professor Cowen has what he might call "meta-preference" for feeling sorry, because he thinks that he "should" feel sorry for posting such an unprofessional and unthoughtful headline to his response to Manski, but I don't think he is in fact sorry. The reason is that if you read Cowen's post, it is quite long, and in fact contains some intelligent and well thought-out points, which to me shows that he has carefully thought about how he feels about the issue.
2. I think the statement "this is absurd" tells us more about Cowen than it does about the piece by Manski. I do not mean this to be turning the term "absurd" on Cowen's view, because I think the details of his post have some merit. Rather I think his use of "absurd" mostly tells us that Cowen feels very strongly that taxes are distortionary and that this should be a topic of focus when economists discuss them. This view has some merit, but it fails to recognize that the alternative to a market "distorted" by government and taxes is seldom a free and well-functioning market in the neoclassical sense. Focusing on the distortions of taxes and government do a poor job of recognizing the ways in which a well functioning (even if also very large) government can help to make property rights more secure and reduce the transactions costs and risks associated with impersonal market exchange. Higher taxes can introduce some distortions, but they may be better than the distortions introduced under the next-best (institutional) alternative.
Tuesday, July 16, 2013
A Property Rights Analysis of Gun Rights, Stand Your Ground Laws, and "The Verdict"
I've tried not to comment too directly on the verdict in the George Zimmerman trial. I wanted to take some time to think about the situation more clearly, and whether the verdict itself reveals anything useful that can help us think better about policy. What limited comment I have made about the George Zimmerman verdict is that it should present an opportunity to rethink the wisdom of "Stand Your Ground" and other laws that seem to embolden armed citizens into doing stupid (but perhaps not criminally stupid) things. For one thing, such laws have been linked to increases in the homicide rate.
But I felt the need to ground my thinking with some theoretical foundations. Here's what I came up with: We need more laws to extend full "rights" to gun owners. Before anyone's head explodes, let me clarify what I mean by "rights." In economics, "property rights" can be thought of as a "bundle of sticks." A narrow interpretation of property rights over a good or an asset is your "ability, in expected terms, to consume the good (or the services of the asset) directly or to consume it indirectly through exchange" (Barzel 1989, emphasis in original). Basically, this means that you have the right to use your property how you want, the right to sell it, and the right to dispose of it in whatever way maximizes your own utility. Barzel also notes:
But, there's a flip side of the coin. Property rights also entail certain responsibilities. One such responsibility is the responsibility of protecting your property from capture by others. Another is the responsibility for how you use that property should that use infringe upon the property rights of others.
So what does this have to do with the George Zimmerman/Trayvon Martin case? As we all know, the night Trayvon Martin was killed, George Zimmerman was exercising his second amendment right to bear arms, and his right, under Florida law, to carry a concealed weapon. The same night, at the same time, in the same neighborhood, Trayvon Martin was exercising his own right to use the public streets. Mr. Zimmerman felt suspicious that Mr. Martin might have been up to some criminal activities, but that appears not to be the case. Regardless, Mr. Zimmerman felt, for whatever reason, that Mr. Martin did not belong in that neighborhood at that time of night. He felt that Mr. Martin was infringing (or intended to infringe) on his or his neighbors' property.
So, Mr. Zimmerman pursued Mr. Martin, first in his car and then on foot. The result was an altercation in which Mr. Zimmerman shot and killed Trayvon Martin. What was said or done between Zimmerman leaving his car and Martin's death is unclear.
Before getting into the legal dimension let me first say that I realize that Zimmerman did not invoke the "stand your ground" protections of Florida law during his defense, although it seems he may intend to do so in the event of a civil trial. My concern is not to re-litigate Mr. Zimmerman's case, but rather to focus on how policy could be reshaped to prevent the next tragedy of this kind.
I am no fan of guns. I am no fan of the second amendment. But they are embedded in our constitution, and we need to shape our laws around them. For this reason, I oppose strict regulations and bans on the types of weapons individuals can purchase. I prefer a registration process, as well as taxes and fees with the goal of reducing the overall number of guns, mostly because there are more than 16,000 gun-related suicide deaths that get far too little attention in the gun control debate.
With my views on guns in the open, let's return to Florida law. Broadly speaking, stand your ground statutes broaden the scope of "self defense" and also provide immunity from both criminal charges and civil litigation in the event that one person kills another when there is reasonable belief that her or his life is in danger. In economic terms, it reduces the level of responsibility assigned to an individual who uses deadly force (often with a firearm), and thus it actually weakens gun ownership rights (thinking of rights in economic terms as a vector of rights and responsibilities). Repealing stand your ground laws, and even replacing them with strong laws outlining strict consequences for individuals who behave recklessly while exercising their second amendment rights will help greatly in preventing the sort of tragedy that happened on February 26 2012 in Sanford, Florida from happening elsewhere.
But I felt the need to ground my thinking with some theoretical foundations. Here's what I came up with: We need more laws to extend full "rights" to gun owners. Before anyone's head explodes, let me clarify what I mean by "rights." In economics, "property rights" can be thought of as a "bundle of sticks." A narrow interpretation of property rights over a good or an asset is your "ability, in expected terms, to consume the good (or the services of the asset) directly or to consume it indirectly through exchange" (Barzel 1989, emphasis in original). Basically, this means that you have the right to use your property how you want, the right to sell it, and the right to dispose of it in whatever way maximizes your own utility. Barzel also notes:
The distinction sometimes made between property rights and human rights is spurious. Human rights are simply part of a person's property rights. Human rights may be difficult to protect or exchange, but so are rights to many other assets.Thus, we can include civil liberties (such as free speech), other constitutionally-granted rights (such as the right to bear arms), and the right to live to be, in a way, property rights.
But, there's a flip side of the coin. Property rights also entail certain responsibilities. One such responsibility is the responsibility of protecting your property from capture by others. Another is the responsibility for how you use that property should that use infringe upon the property rights of others.
So what does this have to do with the George Zimmerman/Trayvon Martin case? As we all know, the night Trayvon Martin was killed, George Zimmerman was exercising his second amendment right to bear arms, and his right, under Florida law, to carry a concealed weapon. The same night, at the same time, in the same neighborhood, Trayvon Martin was exercising his own right to use the public streets. Mr. Zimmerman felt suspicious that Mr. Martin might have been up to some criminal activities, but that appears not to be the case. Regardless, Mr. Zimmerman felt, for whatever reason, that Mr. Martin did not belong in that neighborhood at that time of night. He felt that Mr. Martin was infringing (or intended to infringe) on his or his neighbors' property.
So, Mr. Zimmerman pursued Mr. Martin, first in his car and then on foot. The result was an altercation in which Mr. Zimmerman shot and killed Trayvon Martin. What was said or done between Zimmerman leaving his car and Martin's death is unclear.
Before getting into the legal dimension let me first say that I realize that Zimmerman did not invoke the "stand your ground" protections of Florida law during his defense, although it seems he may intend to do so in the event of a civil trial. My concern is not to re-litigate Mr. Zimmerman's case, but rather to focus on how policy could be reshaped to prevent the next tragedy of this kind.
I am no fan of guns. I am no fan of the second amendment. But they are embedded in our constitution, and we need to shape our laws around them. For this reason, I oppose strict regulations and bans on the types of weapons individuals can purchase. I prefer a registration process, as well as taxes and fees with the goal of reducing the overall number of guns, mostly because there are more than 16,000 gun-related suicide deaths that get far too little attention in the gun control debate.
With my views on guns in the open, let's return to Florida law. Broadly speaking, stand your ground statutes broaden the scope of "self defense" and also provide immunity from both criminal charges and civil litigation in the event that one person kills another when there is reasonable belief that her or his life is in danger. In economic terms, it reduces the level of responsibility assigned to an individual who uses deadly force (often with a firearm), and thus it actually weakens gun ownership rights (thinking of rights in economic terms as a vector of rights and responsibilities). Repealing stand your ground laws, and even replacing them with strong laws outlining strict consequences for individuals who behave recklessly while exercising their second amendment rights will help greatly in preventing the sort of tragedy that happened on February 26 2012 in Sanford, Florida from happening elsewhere.
Friday, March 15, 2013
Thoughts on Tenure
A colleague of mine recently posted the following on tenure:
Consider what tenure does. It is part of a compensation package designed to reduce mobility. It is a barrier to exit in the college professor employment market. Thus it reduces bargaining power for the professoriate effectively by reducing any holdup costs. Professors cannot make a very credible threat to leave if they feel their working conditions are bad or wages are too low.I'm not sure this captures everything that tenure does. In fact, many professors seek (and successfully find) better jobs. Continuing,
In other words, removing tenure, like the end of serfdom, should increase the likelihood that the professoriate will innovate to keep themselves competitive and increase their wages.I'm not as sure about this. Innovation is very risky when one's employment is tenuous and one's continued employment is determined by the noisy signal of student perceptions of teaching quality. I could see a valid transactions costs argument that would predict less innovation, lower overall teaching quality, and poorer administration of higher education as a result of ending tenure. Tenure exists to encourage professors to make institution-specific investments, including serving on administrative committees, advising students and student organizations, maintaining academic standards, and agreeing to meet help teach courses that match the needs of the students in the department or college. Otherwise, rational faculty members will have a greater incentive to spend their energy focusing on research and gaming their teaching evaluations. There are many things broken about higher education. I am not sure that tenure is highest on the list of problems.
Thursday, January 10, 2013
Monday, October 22, 2012
"Inefficient" Redistribution, or "Efficient" Insurance?
This crossed my mind this morning. I'm wary of lowering downside risk without some mitigation of the rewards, i.e. a mean preserving spread. But the new institutional economics has a lot to say about this. For example, one seeming paradox is that democracy complements markets, yet is more prone to social redistribution. North and his various coauthors have argued in several places that, for one thing, this cannot be explained by simple neoclassical theories, and two, that it may not be such a paradox.
Oddly, the argument made by Jon Stewart (and which they guy with the funny name was hesitant to endorse) is close to what the institutional school has argues for some time.
The main roles of the state in promoting social welfare (that is, the overall well being of society) are (1) protecting private property rights (from both internal and external bandits); (2) lowering transactions costs; and (3) mitigating the risks associated with market participation. For example, a feudal system may not have promoted much "efficiency", but it did provide a framework for protecting both elites and non-elites from violence.
Fast forward a bit. Why is it today that the most market-oriented economies are also both democratic and the most prone to "inefficient" redistribution? Is it mere rent-seeking by special interests? Hardly, although this may be partly the case. In fact, it seems that the most well-organized interests influencing the government would be opposed to redistribution in the form of social security, medicare, health care, welfare, etc. The argument that North and others make (and one that liberal politicians should be making more) is that reducing risk is important to a well-functioning market economy because it makes it easier for citizens to participate in the market.
Two things I disagree with from the video: (1) it's not just about lowering risk - for justify this in the context of market mechanisms, there has to be a premium that individuals pay when they realize the "high returns" outcome, i.e. higher average tax rates for the rich and wealthy; (2) it's not about "entrepreneurship", it's about market participation in general.
Oddly, the argument made by Jon Stewart (and which they guy with the funny name was hesitant to endorse) is close to what the institutional school has argues for some time.
| The Daily Show with Jon Stewart | Mon - Thurs 11p / 10c | |||
| Exclusive - Austan Goolsbee Extended Interview Pt. 3 | ||||
| ||||
The main roles of the state in promoting social welfare (that is, the overall well being of society) are (1) protecting private property rights (from both internal and external bandits); (2) lowering transactions costs; and (3) mitigating the risks associated with market participation. For example, a feudal system may not have promoted much "efficiency", but it did provide a framework for protecting both elites and non-elites from violence.
Fast forward a bit. Why is it today that the most market-oriented economies are also both democratic and the most prone to "inefficient" redistribution? Is it mere rent-seeking by special interests? Hardly, although this may be partly the case. In fact, it seems that the most well-organized interests influencing the government would be opposed to redistribution in the form of social security, medicare, health care, welfare, etc. The argument that North and others make (and one that liberal politicians should be making more) is that reducing risk is important to a well-functioning market economy because it makes it easier for citizens to participate in the market.
Two things I disagree with from the video: (1) it's not just about lowering risk - for justify this in the context of market mechanisms, there has to be a premium that individuals pay when they realize the "high returns" outcome, i.e. higher average tax rates for the rich and wealthy; (2) it's not about "entrepreneurship", it's about market participation in general.
Thursday, October 4, 2012
The Political Economy of the Romney Tax Plan
I reeeeeally want to try to give Candidate Romney the benefit of the doubt today. I want to think that he's an honest, sincere man who wants to do the right thing for the country when it comes to tax policy. I want to be part of the 53 percent of Americans who favors Romney's arguments on taxes. I also want to be able to blow off the contradictory comments by his VP nominee, saying that under their plan people will pay less in taxes to the federal government, while maintaining that the plan would be revenue neutral ("it would take me too long to go through all of the math" wasn't even the worst part of the interview!). I even want to ignore the fact that Mr. Romney won't give sufficient details about his plan for think tanks like the Tax Policy Center to score it. Even the conservative Heritage Foundation cannot give a definitive analysis of how Romney's plan would achieve budget-neutrality. In fact, all Heritage does do is criticize the TPC's analysis for not having enough information. Touche.
But I want to ignore all of those inconsistencies in the analysis. Let's imagine that there are enough deductions that can be eliminated to compensate for the several hundred billion dollars in rate reductions Mr. Romney proposes. Let's assume that the secret details of Mr. Romney's plan to broaden the base through eliminating deductions will work. What, then, is the political equilibrium of the legislative bargaining process?
What I would suggest is that any political equilibrium would result in all or most of the loophole-closings would get tossed out of the bill through the influence of special interests, ideological gridlock. I would also suggest that, in order to get the bill through, some degree off logrolling will have to occur during the amendment process. (Don't take my word for it, take it from the conservative Cato Institute, a Koch-funded far-right think tank.) But, the one (and possibly only) part of Mr. Romney's plan that is likely to come through the process relatively unscathed is the tax cuts. I doubt Romney is not as attached to the principle of broadening the base as he is to cutting rates; hence, I doubt that that any first-term president seeking reelection would veto a tax cuts that increase the deficit by not eliminating loopholes. A second-term president might.
So, if I'm going to come away from listening to Mr. Romney's tax proposals and still believe that he's being honest, I also have to come away thinking he's incredibly naive.
But I want to ignore all of those inconsistencies in the analysis. Let's imagine that there are enough deductions that can be eliminated to compensate for the several hundred billion dollars in rate reductions Mr. Romney proposes. Let's assume that the secret details of Mr. Romney's plan to broaden the base through eliminating deductions will work. What, then, is the political equilibrium of the legislative bargaining process?
What I would suggest is that any political equilibrium would result in all or most of the loophole-closings would get tossed out of the bill through the influence of special interests, ideological gridlock. I would also suggest that, in order to get the bill through, some degree off logrolling will have to occur during the amendment process. (Don't take my word for it, take it from the conservative Cato Institute, a Koch-funded far-right think tank.) But, the one (and possibly only) part of Mr. Romney's plan that is likely to come through the process relatively unscathed is the tax cuts. I doubt Romney is not as attached to the principle of broadening the base as he is to cutting rates; hence, I doubt that that any first-term president seeking reelection would veto a tax cuts that increase the deficit by not eliminating loopholes. A second-term president might.
So, if I'm going to come away from listening to Mr. Romney's tax proposals and still believe that he's being honest, I also have to come away thinking he's incredibly naive.
Friday, July 20, 2012
Negativity
PAC spending in the last week:
Candidate money spent last week:
I added rough party affiliations for the PACs, but it's worth noting that Moveon.org spent some money in opposition to a democratic candidate for the House of Representatives.
Notice more generally how the money is all piling into the "opposed" column. Source: http://www.opensecrets.org.
| Committee | Entire Cycle Total | Last Week Total | Last 24 Hours Total | Supported | Opposed | Super PAC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Republican National Cmte (R) | $9,485,456 | $9,485,456 | $0 | $0 | $9,485,456 | |
| Priorities USA Action (D) | $14,900,294 | $1,244,192 | $0 | $0 | $14,900,294 | x |
| Restore America's Voice PAC (R) | $582,952 | $111,900 | $0 | $0 | $582,952 | x |
| America's Next Generation(R) | $106,500 | $42,500 | $0 | $0 | $106,500 | x |
| Moveon.org (D) | $367,171 | $33,552 | $0 | $5,400 | $361,771 | |
| National Rifle Assn (R) | $110,952 | $31,459 | $0 | $0 | $110,952 | |
| National Right to Life Victory Fund (R) | $163,260 | $6,786 | $0 | $0 | $163,260 | x |
| Candidate | Entire Cycle Total | Last Week Total | Last 24 Hours Total | Supported | Opposed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Obama, Barack (D) | $27,761,536 | $9,678,101 | $0 | $2,852,327 | $21,064,674 |
| Romney, Mitt (R) | $32,603,333 | $1,277,744 | $0 | $7,285,760 | $25,161,173 |
I added rough party affiliations for the PACs, but it's worth noting that Moveon.org spent some money in opposition to a democratic candidate for the House of Representatives.
Notice more generally how the money is all piling into the "opposed" column. Source: http://www.opensecrets.org.
Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (9780521761734): Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, Barry R. Weingast: Books
By Douglas North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast.
In the middle of this book right now. Makes some interesting arguments about democracy and capitalism, and how countries make the transition from "Natural States", with limited access to modern states, with open access. The discussion of property rights will please the political right; the discussion of the role of government and public goods will please the left. Both groups will walk away from the book equally unhappy with his discussion of special interest groups (spoiler alert: special interests are not all bad!). The argument for how and why democracy is essential for modern capitalism is the only convincing logical case I've seen and is not based on some half-baked liberty argument.
In the middle of this book right now. Makes some interesting arguments about democracy and capitalism, and how countries make the transition from "Natural States", with limited access to modern states, with open access. The discussion of property rights will please the political right; the discussion of the role of government and public goods will please the left. Both groups will walk away from the book equally unhappy with his discussion of special interest groups (spoiler alert: special interests are not all bad!). The argument for how and why democracy is essential for modern capitalism is the only convincing logical case I've seen and is not based on some half-baked liberty argument.
Outsourcing and the Campaign
I've had a little time to reflect on the Bain-outsourcing-Romney stuff. So here are a couple of observations, which I share with the Free Exchange editors at the Economist.
(1) Outsourcing is good on the net, not just for the country receiving the investment, or even some vague global sense. It is welfare-improving for the US in the aggregate.
(2) Outsourcing can be pareto-improving, meaning that not only does it increase income, wealth and efficiency on average, but it is possible to ensure that no one is worse off.
Point (1) implies that, even if you support President Obama, the criticism of outsourcing by itself is misplaced. That includes this criticism by Paul Krugman. We should be outsourcing when it is profitable to do so.
Point (2) is tougher. Basically, it qualifies the political feasibility of (1) by implying that, in order to bring everyone on board with free trade, outsourcing, etc., you need pretty extensive structural adjustment assistance programs also known as the Welfare State. Here, as the Economist correctly points out, we could learn a little something from the 1997 incarnation of Professor Krugman when he says that voters aren't nuanced enough in their understanding of trade and public policy to grasp this subtlety - or care. They know jobs are gone, and US companies are growing operations in China. They win, I lose.
The Economist article points out that Obama could come out with a more nuanced and correct argument. But really, either candidate could take up this mantle and make it part of their platform without abandoning their core values. Mr. Romney, for his part could say, "yes, I am for free markets and outsourcing, and the fact that it puts some folks out of work only highlights the need to reform existing welfare programs so they help people who really want to work." Mr. Obama, instead of spewing protectionist garbage could say, "see, people are hurt by some aspects of free markets and we need social programs like my health care law to make markets work better for everyone" (he could even throw in some of his "shared prosperity" catchphrases).
But neither candidate is doing this. Obama is pretending to be protectionist (when we all know he won't govern that way); Romney is acting like the attacks are simply unfair, which doesn't seem to help much - do we really want a crybaby for a President? Obama's strategy, sadly, is the politically effective one, and I expect to see much more of it through November.
Thursday, July 19, 2012
More on High-Tech Education
More classes are being offered, by prestigious universities - I'm not talking about your diploma mill online courses from the for-profit sector - online, including some I might be interested in myself. More shockingly, many of these classes are being offered free of charge. The question is, "Is this a threat to my job?"
I think not. These sites are very aware of supply-side factors, but they say little about the demand side. While it's true that information transfer does not need to be as costly or labor intensive as it is, it is exactly what many average students need. Motivated, intellectually-curious students can easily absorb information, but many students are not sufficiently motivated or intellectually curious to do so.
Instead, I still think that technology is an effective complement to labor-intensive instruction at many liberal arts colleges and universities, but perhaps less so at large state flagship universities, and will make personalized (but still labor intensive) instruction more enhanced.
I think not. These sites are very aware of supply-side factors, but they say little about the demand side. While it's true that information transfer does not need to be as costly or labor intensive as it is, it is exactly what many average students need. Motivated, intellectually-curious students can easily absorb information, but many students are not sufficiently motivated or intellectually curious to do so.
Instead, I still think that technology is an effective complement to labor-intensive instruction at many liberal arts colleges and universities, but perhaps less so at large state flagship universities, and will make personalized (but still labor intensive) instruction more enhanced.
Monday, July 9, 2012
A fourth and hybrid perspective on the future of on-line education — Marginal Revolution
Articles like this one sorta irritate me because they pretend that we haven't been here before. Distance education is not a new thing; the technology has merely changed. If you could get an equivalent value out of your education without contact time in meatspace, why didn't correspondence courses take over the market decades ago? I am surprised that bloggers like Tyler Cowen are not more cognizant of this.
Wednesday, July 4, 2012
Some Links on International Economics
A very interesting post on the political economy of trade policy. Econbrowser: Thirty Years Ago Today: Racial and ethnic animosity play an important role; however, you'd think politicians would try to veil that dimension more than they do here or here.
Also very interesting, new research on the role of industry fragmentation and global supply chains. Unilateral tariff liberalisation | vox.
How big are the gains from trade? « Trade Diversion: Some research has suggested much smaller gains from trade based on some of the classical models. When one takes a more modern approach (especially accounting for "cross-industry variation in trade elasticities") the gains from trade are as big as they ever were (around 25-45 percent of GDP for the US).
The World Bank has published a new book on migration and remittances: Migration and remittances during the crisis and beyond.
Also very interesting, new research on the role of industry fragmentation and global supply chains. Unilateral tariff liberalisation | vox.
How big are the gains from trade? « Trade Diversion: Some research has suggested much smaller gains from trade based on some of the classical models. When one takes a more modern approach (especially accounting for "cross-industry variation in trade elasticities") the gains from trade are as big as they ever were (around 25-45 percent of GDP for the US).
The World Bank has published a new book on migration and remittances: Migration and remittances during the crisis and beyond.
Thursday, June 21, 2012
Links on institutions
Commodity Prices and Institutions
Property Rights and Growth - some interesting historical perspective. For more on property rights in medieval England, I am currently reading North, Wallis, and Weingast, Violence and Social Orders.
Property Rights and Growth - some interesting historical perspective. For more on property rights in medieval England, I am currently reading North, Wallis, and Weingast, Violence and Social Orders.
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